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Children often learn from others’ demonstrations, but in the causal domain, evidence 
acquired from observing others may be more ambiguous than evidence generated for 
oneself. Prior work involving tool-using tasks suggests that observational learning 
may not provide sufficient information about the causal relations involved, but it 
remains unclear whether these limitations can by mitigated by providing 
demonstrations using familiar manual actions rather than unfamiliar tools. We 
provided 2.5- to 3.5-year-old children (n = 67) with the opportunity to acquire 
experience with a causal trap-task by hand or by tool, actively or from observing 
others. Initially, children either generated their own experience or watched a yoked 
demonstration; all children then attempted the trap-task with the tool. Children who 
generated their own experience outperformed those who watched demonstration. 
Hand- or tool-use had no effect on performance with a tool. The implications of these 
findings for scaffolding self-guided learning and for demonstrations involving errors 
are discussed. 
 








 Children received different types of initial experience with a causal trap-task. 
 From age 3, generating one’s own experience led to above-chance 
performance. 
 If the same experience was given through demonstration, performance was at 
chance. 






Children learn a great deal through faithfully copying the form of an action. Such 
high-fidelity copying has been suggested to bootstrap the process of cultural 
transmission, helping children acquire and reproduce the actions needed for 
complex behaviours such as tool-use without necessarily understanding the 
underlying mechanism (Csibra & Gergely, 2009). Yet action copying may hinder 
causal learning, because one must look beyond the specific form of a demonstrator’s 
action to extract the causal principles driving that choice of action. From age two, 
children often copy actions that are superfluous to the causal structure of a task (for a 
review, see Hoehl et al., 2019). However, such inefficient copying can be mitigated by 
giving children personal experience with the task prior to demonstration (Wood, 
Kendal, & Flynn, 2013).  
In contrast to personal experiences, demonstrations are intrinsically 
ambiguous. For instance, demonstrators may fail to highlight all of the critical causal 
relations, and learners may not fully understand even the most well-formed 
demonstration (Sobel & Sommerville, 2010). Learner-directed exploration offers a 
comparably more powerful route to causal learning. For instance, it allows learners 
to confirm that a causal relation between two events is not influenced by some 
unobserved third variable (Kushnir, Wellman, & Gelman, 2009; Sobel & 
Sommerville, 2010), or to systematically isolate the task features most relevant to the 
causal structure (Sim, Mahal, & Xu, 2017). Finally, through attempting a task 
themselves, learners also gain experience with the actions needed to solve the task, 
and increased familiarity with those actions may make it easier to focus on the 
underlying causal structure. The advantage of such interventions over observing 
demonstrations can be seen throughout development. In infants, active personal 




new actions (Gerson, Mahajan, Sommerville, Matz, & Woodward, 2015; Gerson & 
Woodward, 2014). From 2.5 years, children learn causal rules equally efficiently from 
self-generated experience and direct instruction (Sim & Xu, 2017), but by 3–4 years, 
self-generated intervention trumps passive observation (Kushnir et al., 2009; Sim et 
al., 2017). Finally, school-aged children learn causal structures better if they 
intervene before watching an experimenter act, rather than the other way around 
(Kuhn & Ho, 1980; Sobel & Sommerville, 2010). 
The advantage of generating personal experience during causal learning may 
be especially pronounced when the task’s solutions cannot be learnt by copying the 
form of the actions involved, because the actions themselves must be related to some 
external goal. One such task is the trap-task, in which subjects must push a reward 
out of a horizontal tube, typically using a tool, while avoiding obstructions that would 
trap the reward (Horner & Whiten, 2007; Seed & Call, 2014; Visalberghi & 
Limongelli, 1994; Want & Harris, 2001). Because the tool can be inserted from either 
end of the apparatus, and the reward’s location relative to the trap varies across 
trials, any strategy other than consistently avoiding the trap results in chance 
performance. As a result, the trap-task is ideal for comparing active and 
observational experience because it cannot be solved by copying a demonstrator’s 
actions alone, but only by understanding those actions’ spatial relation to the trap. 
Prior studies found that 2- to 4-year-olds failed to solve the trap-task independently, 
and performed only at chance even following correct, incorrect, and mixed-
correctness demonstrations (Horner & Whiten, 2007; Want & Harris, 2001). 
However, neither study controlled for how the amount of task experience differed 
between the self-generated and demonstration groups. A more meaningful 
comparison would control the amount of task experience, while varying whether that 




Moreover, children may struggle to learn the trap-task from demonstration 
because its causal principles are complicated by the element of tool-use. Even the 
simple lateral motions called for in the trap-task require children to relate the tool, 
the reward, and the trap in terms of their spatial, physical, and causal properties 
(Fragaszy & Cummins-Sebree, 2005; Völter & Call, 2014). Simultaneously and 
continuously maintaining these relations may drain attentional and executive 
resources, thereby interfering with the selection of appropriate actions for a 
particular goal (Smitsman & Cox, 2008). Indeed, such a cognitive load would explain 
why children under 3 years often perseverate to one side when solving trap-tasks 
(Seed & Call, 2014; Want & Harris, 2001). Reducing the number of causal elements 
involved – namely, by replacing tool-use with manual actions – improves trap-task 
performance not only in 2.5-year-old children (Seed & Call, 2014), but also in 
chimpanzees (Seed, Call, Emery, & Clayton, 2009). 
By extension, the difficulty of learning the trap-task through observation may 
be compounded by having to parse the goal of a demonstrator who is using a novel, 
unfamiliar tool. Observational learning of tool-use requires observers to chain 
multiple actions with proximal targets (e.g., grasping the tool, inserting the tool, 
pushing the tool against the reward) in service of an overarching distal goal 
(retrieving the reward by avoiding the trap). Such distal goals may therefore be more 
difficult to grasp when tool-use replaces manual actions. There is evidence for this 
difficulty in infants and pre-schoolers: Infants can identify an actor’s goal from a 
direct manual reach towards a toy from the age of 6 months, but do not infer the goal 
of a tool-using action until later in development (Sommerville & Woodward, 2005; 
Woodward, 1998). Similarly, 2- to 5-year-olds are more likely to copy unecessary 




because of the increased difficulty in identifying the relationship between the action 
and the goal (Taniguchi & Sanefuji, 2017). 
The distal goals of tool-using actions could be made more apparent through 
comparison with a familiar action, by highlighting the analogical links between 
structurally similar situations (Gentner, 2010). In infancy, Gerson and Woodward 
(2012) found that 10-month-olds that used familiar manual actions to grasp for a toy 
alongside an experimenter’s tool-use demonstration were more capable of goal 
understanding and imitation than infants that just observed the tool-using 
demonstration. A similar logic might apply to parsing more complex relational goals 
in older children: Seeing a familiar manual action might make it easier for children 
to understand the causal relationship between the action, the reward and the 
obstacle, and therefore the experimenter’s goal (to extract the reward and avoid the 
trap). In this study, alongside exploring whether children learned better from self-
generated experience compared to demonstration, we also aimed to explore if the 
type of action experienced would make a difference. We predicted that children 
would find it easier to extract a demonstrator’s goal from manual demonstrations 
than from watching tool use, and that this might mitigate any difference between 
self-generated experience and demonstration.   
The present study investigated the effect of prior experience (self- or other- 
generated) on children’s ability to use a tool to solve a trap-task, while varying 
whether this experience was generated with a tool or by hand. We tested children 
aged 2.5–3.5 years because previous research has shown this to be the age range over 
which children’s ability to solve the manual task emerges, although they perform 
more poorly when using a tool at this age (Seed & Call, 2014; Völter & Call, 2014). 
Thus we expected this to be the most sensitive age range over which any effect of 




2×2 between-subjects design, children gained 10 trials of experience with the trap-
task in one of four between-subjects learning conditions: Self–Hand, Self–Tool, 
Demonstration–Hand, or Demonstration–Tool. All four groups then received 10 test 
trials with the tool version of the trap-task. Based on the research outlined above, we 
predicted that children in the Self conditions would outperform those in the 
Demonstration conditions at test, having actively generated more personal 
experience with the task to support causal learning. Furthermore, we predicted that 
the task would be easier to learn after practising manually, rather than with a tool, 
resulting in higher scores in the Hand than Tool conditions when using a tool at test. 
Finally, we predicted that watching a hand demonstration would result in better test 
performance than watching a tool demonstration, because familiar actions would 
make the demonstrator’s distal goals easier to parse. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Sixty-seven children aged 30 to 42 months (M age = 36.2 months, 35 males) 
were recruited using opportunity sampling and tested on-site at a science museum 
and café in a small city in the UK. A power analysis (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007) was used to determine that a sample size of 67 would be sufficient to 
detect a large effect (f = 0.45), assuming α = 0.05 and power = 0.95. Five additional 
children were recruited but excluded from the final sample because they did not 
complete testing. All parents completed written informed consent, and all children 
gave verbal assent; participation was rewarded with stickers. Ethical approval was 





The 2×2 (experience type × action type) design yielded four between-subjects 
conditions: Self–Hand (n = 17), Self–Tool (n = 17), Demonstration–Hand (n = 17), 
and Demonstration–Tool (n = 16). Each child first completed an initial phase (10 
trials) according to their assigned condition, followed by a test phase (10 further 
trials) that was identical across conditions, in which each child attempted to solve the 
task themselves with the tool. The participant recruitment process focused first on 
the Self–Hand and Self–Tool conditions, in which the 10 trials of initial experience 
were generated by the children themselves using the appropriate action type. Those 
children’s patterns of successes and failures was then used to generate scripts for the 
10 trials of demonstration given by the experimenter (E) in the corresponding 
Demonstration–Hand and Demonstration–Tool conditions. Prospective participants 
who matched a child in the Self-conditions (matching criteria: same sex, age ±2 
months) were assigned to be their yoked partner in the corresponding 
Demonstration-condition. This ensured that those in the demonstration-conditions 
received experience typical for their sex and age group, approximating the 
performance they themselves might have achieved. 
Materials 
The trap-task was a plastic box (43 cm long, 10 cm deep, 24 cm tall) mounted 
above a base, with a central shelf and two exits at the bottom. The box back, sides, 
and shelf were opaque white, and the top and front were transparent. Sliding doors 
in the back allowed E to place a transparent plastic ball (5 cm diameter, containing a 
sticker reward) on the shelf, and to retrieve it from trapped exits. The ball could 
travel along the shelf (18 cm long, 6 cm deep, 15 cm above the base) and fall off either 







Figure 1. The trap-task as configured for manual (A) and tool (B) use, with sample 
trap locations. Arrows show exit locations of reward, given the location of the trap in 
that particular trial. Trap locations varied between trials. 
 
During testing, the front of the box was covered by one of two transparent, 
removable panels. One panel had five slots cut into it (each slot 1.75 cm high, 5 cm 
long, spaced 1 cm apart), allowing the ball to be pushed along the shelf using a finger. 
The other lacked slots, requiring children to push the ball by inserting a tool through 
gaps (4 cm tall, 3.5 cm wide) on either side of the box. The tool (35 cm long, 2.5 cm 
diameter) was made of purple plastic with a handle at one end. See Figure 1. 
From the child’s perspective, the ball could only exit the box through the 
bottom exits. All other possibilities were either too narrow (the side gaps) or on the 
side of the box controlled by E (the sliding doors). In each trial, E obstructed one of 
the bottom exits with an orange plastic trap. The trap’s location varied pseudo-
randomly throughout the experiment, appearing equally often on both sides but 
never more than twice consecutively on a particular side. Trap locations were 





Pre-testing. Children sat in front of the trap-task, either by themselves or on 
a parent’s lap. Parents were asked to refrain from giving cues. E sat directly behind 
the box. After affixing the appropriate front panel, E held the ball at each of the 
vertical exits and encouraged the child to take it, before placing a sticker in the ball 
and placing the ball on the central shelf. E then came to the child’s side of the table to 
demonstrate how to move the ball, without fully moving it into an exit; in the Hand-
conditions, she used a finger to push it slightly in both directions, and in the Tool-
conditions, she briefly inserted the tool in each side of the box without touching the 
ball. Finally, E encouraged the child to look (“Watch!”) as she slid the trap piece into 
place. 
Phase 1: Initial experience. The child received 10 trials of active (self-
generated) or observational (demonstration) experience with the trap-task, using 
either a hand or the tool to extract the ball. In the Self-conditions, E told the child, 
“Now it’s your turn. Try to get the ball out of the box.” E always gave the tool to the 
child orientated vertically, to avoid favouring either side of the trap-task. If the child 
requested help or did nothing, E responded neutrally, and reminded them how to 
move the ball by repeating the pre-testing demonstration. In the Demonstration-
conditions, E said, “First, I’m going to show you a few times how to get the ball out of 
the box, then it’ll be your turn.” She then repeated the failure or success of the 
matched child on that trial, using the appropriate action type; the child was not 
permitted to retrieve the ball during Phase 1. 
A trial ended when the child/E pushed the ball off the shelf into one of the 
vertical channels. Whenever the ball was successfully retrieved, E celebrated the 
success and gave the child the sticker. Whenever the ball became trapped, E noted 
that the child would not get the sticker but reaffirmed that whoever was trying (child 




and drew the child’s attention to the trap. She said, “Try to get the ball out of the 
box!” or “Let’s see if I can get this ball out of the box…” as appropriate, and the next 
trial began. In the Demonstration-conditions, the 10 trials of initial experience 
therefore consisted of the same sequence of successful and unsuccessful trials as had 
been produced by the participant’s yoked partner. 
Phase 2: Test. After the initial phase, E removed the front panel and 
replaced it with the slotless panel (in all conditions, to control for disruption). She 
held the ball at each vertical exit and encouraged the child to take it, before briefly 
inserting the tool in both sides of the box to show how the ball could be retrieved. 
The child then attempted to solve the trap-task using the tool for 10 further trials. 
The procedure for this portion was identical to that described above for the self-
generated conditions. Testing continued until the child had completed 10 test trials, 
for a total of 20 trials; every child received a final sticker regardless of performance. 
Scoring and Analysis 
At the end of each trial, E documented which channel the ball had been 
pushed into and whether that choice was correct. A tripod-mounted videocamera 
captured children’s actions on the front of the box. Twenty percent of all videos were 
randomly selected for re-coding; observers agreed on the outcomes of over 98% of 
trials (Cohen’s kappa = .96).  
 
Results 
Children’s performance was analysed in terms of the proportion of correct trials over 
the 10 trials of the test phase; the full data is available online (DOI: 
10.6084/m9.figshare.9964169). Because our proportion data was non-normally 
distributed, we modelled children’s performance during the test phase using a 




cumulative logit link function. Ordinal data takes a multinomial distribution, and the 
use of a cumulative logit link function is what assumes ordered data. Age was 
included as a covariate, and experience type and action type were considered 
between-subjects predictors; the interaction term was experience type × action type. 
There was a significant main effect of experience type when controlling for age, Wald 
𝜒1
2 = 6.22, 𝑝 = .013, such that children in the Demonstration-conditions performed 
worse than children in the Self-conditions, β = -1.18, 95% Wald CI [-2.47, 0.12]. 
Contrary to our predictions, there was no effect of action type, Wald 𝜒1
2 = 0.01, 𝑝 =
.915, nor was there an interaction between action type and experience type, Wald 
𝜒1
2 < 0.01, 𝑝 = .976. Finally, age in months was significantly associated with test 
performance, Wald 𝜒1
2 = 14.73, 𝑝 < .001, such that children performed better with 
increasing age, β = 0.26, 95% Wald CI [0.13, 0.40]. See Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Dotplot showing children’s performance, split by action type (hand or tool), 
experience type (self-generated or demonstration), and phase (initial or test). Each 




represented here using a median split (Mdn = 37.3 mos), but note that age was 
treated as a continuous variable in the analyses. Initial phase data from the 




Because prior research associated tool-use with chance and side-biased 
performance, we also examined the characteristics of children’s performance. Using 
binomial tests, each child’s overall performance in the initial (Self-conditions only) 
and test phases was assigned one of four characteristics: significantly above chance 
(≥.9 successful trials), significantly below chance (≤.1 successful trials), side-biased 
(pushing the ball to a given side for ≥.9 trials), or other (see Table 1). 
Table 1. 
Performance of children in initial and test phases, by condition. 
       Initial phase  Test phase 
   Age (months)   Fail   Fail 
Condition n  M range SD  AC BC SB Other  AC BC SB Other 
Self–Hand 17  36.9 30.8–42.4 3.2  4 5 4 4  5 0 7 5 
Self–Tool 17  36.2 30.1–42.7 4.2  1 0 11 5  4 0 8 5 
Demo–Hand 17  36.9 30.0–42.0 3.5       2 3 9 3 
Demo–Tool 16  36.1 30.0–40.8 4.0       1 1 8 6 
Note. For each block of 10 trials, each child’s performance was categorised as above chance (AC, ≥9 trials correct), below 
chance (BC, ≤1 trial correct), side-biased (SB, chance performance with the ball pushed to one particular side for ≥9 trials), or 
other (chance performance without side bias). Initial phase data from the demonstration-groups is once again omitted because 
these children did not produce their own initial experience. 
 
Chi-square analyses reveal that in the initial phase, non-chance performance 
was significantly associated with condition in the initial phase, 𝜒1
2 = 24.52, 𝑝 <
.001, 𝑉 = 1.28, as was side-bias, 𝜒1
2 = 23.00, 𝑝 < .001, 𝑉 = 1.24. Half of the children in 
the Self-Hand condition (9/17) consistently directed the reward into the either the 
trap or the open exit, whereas the majority of children in the Self–Tool condition 
(11/17) performed exactly at chance due to side-bias. However, these differences did 




non-chance performance at test, 𝜒3
2 = 1.71, 𝑝 = .634, 𝑉 = 0.16, nor between condition 
and side-bias, 𝜒3
2 = 0.51, 𝑝 = .916, 𝑉 = 0.09. 
 
Discussion 
A key finding from the present study is that children who generated their own 
experience went on to significantly outperform those who watched yoked 
demonstration. These findings extend a growing literature on the benefits of self-
generated experience in other causal tasks (Kushnir et al., 2009; Rakison & Krogh, 
2012; Sim et al., 2017; Sim & Xu, 2014, 2017; Sobel & Sommerville, 2010) and in 
pedagogy (Mavilidi, Okely, Chandler, Domazet, & Paas, 2018), raising the question of 
the cognitive mechanisms that might explain this advantage. 
Active experience may be a particularly powerful tool in a causal learning 
context because of the special status of action as intervention. Interventionist 
accounts of causation argue that an event, X, can only be said to cause another event, 
Y, if intervening on X subsequently changes Y (Gopnik & Schulz, 2007). In this view, 
self-generated action functions as an independent variable within the causal system, 
because only through intervention can truly causal relations be distinguished from 
those that merely correlate or covary. Our results show that children learnt the trap-
task’s underlying causal relations (as indexed by success at test) most effectively 
through acting on the variables involved, rather than through observing others’ 
interventions; crucially, this was true despite the content of the interventions being 
held constant. 
These results align with work from the adult literature proposing that active 
intervention improves performance on causal tasks through high-level mechanisms 
such as hypothesis testing (Sobel & Kushnir, 2006; Steyvers, Tenenbaum, 




improvements were driven by lower-level mechanisms, such as differences in 
temporal cues between active and passive interventions (Lagnado & Sloman, 2004), 
or by increased automaticity of movement gained through repeated practice. In our 
task, all children’s initial experience was seen in real-time and presented with cause 
preceding effect. Furthermore, practising with the necessary action type did not 
improve test performance, as the children who had had to transfer between action 
types were just as successful as those who had practised with a tool throughout.  
Indeed, the present study found no effect of action type at test, but the initial 
phase of learning was markedly influenced by hand- or tool-use. Initial performance 
in the Self-Tool condition was characterized by high rates of side-bias, whereas Self-
Hand tended to be either significantly above or below chance. In other words, 
learning the task by hand seemed to better equip children to causally relate the trap, 
their hands, and the reward, regardless of which location they chose to target. By 
comparison, tool-use encouraged random or perseverative responses, as might be 
expected given its cognitive load (Fragaszy & Cummins-Sebree, 2005; Smitsman & 
Cox, 2008; Völter & Call, 2014). Yet the lack of difference between action types at 
test could suggest that the Self–Hand children found it difficult to transfer their 
solution across the change in action type from hand to tool.  
Although we had anticipated that tool-demonstrations would not support 
learning, we did not find better performance following a hand-demonstration, 
perhaps because both demonstration groups were equally confused about the 
demonstrator’s goals. Regardless of action type, the study’s yoked design ensured 
that many children watched the demonstrator – an unfamiliar and authoritative 
adult – repeatedly and purposefully produce errors, yet express dismay whenever she 
trapped the reward. Children are sensitive to the intentions, knowledge status, and 




2011), meaning that errorful demonstrations might conflict with children’s 
assumption that adults will prioritise giving them relevant, useful knowledge (Csibra 
& Gergely, 2009). This could be explored further by demonstrating only correct 
solutions, or by providing more verbal support, such as explaining that the 
demonstrator intends to show both correct and incorrect solutions to the task. 
However it should be noted that previous work with the trap-task (Want & Harris, 
2001) found that providing both correct and incorrect demonstrations was more 
effective in helping children to avoid side-bias than providing only correct 
demonstrations – though in this study, as in ours, only a small minority of the 2-3 
year-olds that received demonstrations performed significantly above chance level 
(Want & Harris, 2001). 
Another avenue for future work concerns our finding that performance in our 
sample improved with age. One contributing factor may be that, in order to 
successfully generate evidence about the trap-task, children in the Self-conditions 
had to select appropriate and informative learning strategies with minimal guidance. 
Doing so may have been particularly challenging for younger children because the 
metacognitive and executive functions necessary for self-regulated learning improve 
throughout childhood (Pauen & Bechtel-Kuehne, 2016; Roebers, 2017). Indeed, a 
comparable trend has been described earlier in development in motorically simpler 
tasks involving ‘machines’ activated by a particular class of block. Although the 
causal rules governing block choice can be learnt through free play by 30 months 
(Sim & Xu, 2017), 19-month-olds learnt best through play facilitated by an adult (Sim 
& Xu, 2015). For certain age groups or task types, self-generated and demonstrated 
evidence may be most helpful in combination. Future work with the trap-task and 
related tasks could investigate whether younger children’s ability to self-generate 




Taken together, our findings highlight the advantage of generating experience 
for oneself, as doing so provides crucial confirmation of the causal, rather than 
correlational, nature of the relations involved. They also suggest potential 
disadvantages in watching others demonstrate the trap-task, possibly due to 
difficulty parsing demonstrators’ goals, or to concerns about the demonstrator’s 
perceived incompetence. However, the effectiveness of social or individual routes to 
learning also likely depends on the task at hand, the individual child’s developmental 
stage and knowledge state, and the specific features of the social model. 
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